Examining the Connections Between Population and Security

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• Online Feature: Global Security
• State of the World 2005

Worldwatch Live Online Discussion

Richard Cincotta: Senior Research Associate, Population Action International

March 24, 2005 - 3:00pm EDT

In the past few decades, countries from around the world have faced unprecedented shifts in the size and structure of their populations. Many are still entering the early stages of the transition from short lives and large families to longer lives and smaller families and maintain fertility rates above four children per woman. Studies show that countries faced with growing populations, large proportions of youth, and high unemployment are much more likely to face recurrent conflict and the deterioration of social and political systems. How do the size, growth rate, and age structure of a population create instability?

Please join Richard Cincotta, Senior Research Associate at Population Action International and contributing author of State of the World 2005, for a thought-provoking discussion on the links between demographic trends and global insecurity.

Steve Conklin: Welcome to Worldwatch Live. Today's guest is Richard Cincotta, a Senior Research Associate with Population Action International. Welcome, Richard! Could you tell us a little about yourself and what you do at Population Action International?

Richard Cincotta: I am a population biologist by training and a senior research associate at Population Action International. Previous to this position, I worked on foreign assistance policy and evaluation in the US Agency for International Development, in agency's Population, Health and Nutrition Center. I've also had the pleasure of working overseas for 8 years in various project and research related experiences in South Asia, East Asia, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. And, I'm a US Navy veteran.

As a researcher, I've written principally on the environmental, economic and security implications of demographic change, and on reproductive health policy issues. Lisa Mastny, from Worldwatch Institute, is the lead author of the chapter on demography and security featured in "State of the World, 2005." I developed a number of the key arguments for our chapter -- which I think is provocative enough to help stimulate more debate and more research on the relationship between demographic change and conflict.

I'm looking forward to answering some of the questions (which are already filtering in). Thanks to the Worldwatch Institute for inviting me to conduct this webchat, and thanks to the online participants for sending in their questions.

Boston, Ma: We've seen these associations, and what can be done to mitigate the negative consequences during the transition to higher LE and lower fertility rates? Are there models/examples that we can learn from and possibly use to assist or inspire populations going through these transitions regarding conflict management or conflict avoidance?

Richard Cincotta: In essence this question asks: What strategies help mitigate demography-related risks in the short-term? And are there examples?

In fact, there are good examples (and these strategies are familiar to those who work in conflict resolution). Major General William Nash ó on assignment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during Bosnian reconstruction, and then later advising for the United Nations in Kosovo ó purposefully took an extra step in peacemaking, beyond rounding up arms, policing borders and reconstructing democracy. He mobilized local young men for work on post-war reconstruction. The more who could be trained and put to work in a non-military capacity, he believed, the more the real economy (rather than the war economy) could be stimulated, and the more difficult it would become for militias to recruit.

The strategy was very successful in the Balkans, but it was not adopted in Iraq ó U.S. leaders thought it would be too security risk to employ Iraqi young men. Instead, they brought in workers from other countries. Personally, I think this was a huge mistake.

In addition, post-war reconstruction is a perfect opportunity to make progress in womenís participation in governance, womenís rights in the workplace, and in guaranteeing girlsí schooling and access to other important services. Honestly, I cannot point to studies demonstrating definitively that womenís governance is, on average, any more conciliatory or humane than men ó but given the dismal male track record, Iíd be willing to bet a reasonable sum on it.

Actually, Iíve diverged a bit from the question; It was really about how countries not yet in conflict could reduce demographic risk in the short-term. If the conclusions of our research are correct, than policies and programs that promote youth employment (outside the security sector), and those that increase the economic mobility of minorities are likely to help.

Interestingly, some small island nations in the Caribbean and South Pacific have met the challenge of high unemployment, the proliferation of slums, and the virtual disappearance of job opportunities in agriculture by helping their young people to emigrate. Helen Ware, an Australian demographer, has done an excellent job of documenting the various strategies by which island states have helped train young people for overseas employment, found them jobs, helped them send their savings home (these are called remittances), and welcomed them (and their money) back as tourists.

port st. lucie Florida: What is the status of Muslim women and family planning? Are Muslim women receptive to family planning? Are they restrained from seeking family planning services? Three questions, but they are all related.

Richard Cincotta: This question deserves a little background: Within countries, the demographic transition has moved at varying rates through ethnic and religious communities. Demographers disagree over why this occurs. I argue that once the transition has begun, groups in which women have the highest status decline in fertility and infant mortality fastest. For that reason, Muslim groups have tended to pass through the demographic transition later than others in the same country. That said, itís not always Muslim groups that lag. In Indonesia, for example, Timoreans ó many of whom are Christians ó have much higher fertility than Muslims on the western islands of Java and Sumatra. In Israel, rapidly growing Haridim populations (members of ultra-conservative Jewish sects) have higher fertility than either Israeli Arabs or other Israeli Jews.

And, thereís enormous variation between countries in which Muslims are in the majority. The UN Population Division reports that fertility is lower in Tunisia (2.0 children per woman) than in the United States (2.1). Lebanon (2.2 children per woman) is near replacement-level fertility (replacement level is usually around 2.1 children per woman when infant mortality is low). And family size is just slightly higher in Iran, where the government has made family planning accessible and affordable, and where the high school curriculum includes sex education classes. Indonesia, Turkey and Malaysia, all predominantly Muslim countries, are not far behind these nations.

The lesson of the last 30 years is that where women are educated and have opportunities to work outside the home, fertility declines quite rapidly ó no matter what the religious or ethnic background. Some local ethnic and religious traditions actively limit girlsí schooling, and some restrain women from working and from participating in government. I stress the word local ó because the status of women varies among Islamic societies, from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia to Turkey to Morocco. And, of course, womenís status varies among Christian societies, from the Copts of Egypt, to the Mormons of Utah, to the Roman Catholics of the Philippines, to the Syrian Christians of Indiaís Malabar Coast.

Charleston, South Carolina: Why can we not gain NGO and US government attention to the ready availability of fresh water for export to these nations as a strategically valuable answer to their irrigation needs?

Richard Cincotta: It takes about 1000 kilograms of water, on average, to produce a kilogram of flour ó an inefficiency created by the water that must pass through the grass that we call wheat, from its roots to its leaves and into the atmosphere (a process known as transpiration). Exporting water for agricultural irrigation is not a feasible economic proposition.

Exporting "drinking water" is another matter. Many of us are willing to pay relatively high prices for drinking water that comes from afar. And, drinking water has a high ìsecurity value.î It is essential for immediate survival and there is no substitute for it.

Currently, there is a dramatic example of how strategically valuable clean fresh water is, and how much governments are willing to pay (costs which users could not afford). To keep the Turkish Cypriot enclave and a Turkish Army garrison alive and healthy on the eastern end of Cyprus, weekly the Turkish government tows three huge bags of fresh water from a river in Turkey to Cyprus. And, in recent trade negotiations with Turkey, Israel -- fearful of its own future water security -- has discussed the possibility of having a similar scheme that would bring water to an Israeli port.

Paris, France: Livelihoods will likely become scarse with population's growth, and I can figure out that it could create conditions conducive to conflict and political instability. But for instance when you talk about the links between demographic trends and "global" insecurity, what kind of relationships between environmental degradation and political instability do you assume more precisely ? Regards

Richard Cincotta: The research that I was involved in focused principally on the "youth bulge" -- the risks associated with a high proportion of young adults. But, we also determined the levels of risk of civil conflict that were associated with per capita declines in either fresh water (fresh water volume per person) or cropland (cropland area per person). We did not look at data for other types of instabilities, and I did not use a direct measure of environmental degradation; so, I cannot answer your question specifically.

But -- speaking from this research, I did not find strong support for a link between per capita declines in those resources, by themselves, and the risk of civil conflict. In many countries, like South Korea, Japan and Europe, people have found adequate opportunities in urban areas, particularly as growth of the working-age population slowed. However, when a country had a large youth bulge (a large proportion of adults in the population), the added stress of low levels of fresh water or cropland made a statistical difference. These scarcities increased the risk of an outbreak of civil conflict substantially.

How do I interpret this? Scarcities of fresh water and cropland signal the decline of rural food and fiber production as a means of employment. In other words, if youíre not the oldest son of a farmer or herdsman in most developing countries, youíll be going to the city to find work ó you have very little choice. And, if thereís a youth bulge and slow economic growth, you will likely end up in a slum with others who are equally discontent. Cities are the seats of state power; they are homes to universities, labor unions, and political organizations. They tend to be intensely political. Thus, the chances that discontented leadership will find discontented recruits is higher in urban areas, and the risk of some type of civil conflict goes up.

Is it the same for environmental degradation? Environmental degradation of resources, like per capita declines, lowers the ability of rural areas to absorb labor. However, degradation of environmental quality is much more difficult to measure from one country to the next than per capita availability (the quantity of the resource divided by the population). Case studies, particularly those conducted by students and colleagues of Thomas Homer-Dixon at the University of Toronto, show fairly convincing links between civil unrest and resource scarcities ó- scarcities created by a combination of land grabs by elites, population growth and degradation of the resource. These type of livelihood conflicts are serious and, I would guess, increasingly common. But, it has not been convincingly demonstrated that they usually lead to larger conflicts that threaten state stability or global security. Perhaps because of the nature of fresh water, local water conflicts tend to be addressed by state court systems and compromises. Historically, conflicts over cropland have been more likely to lead to civil conflicts. Land reforms and urban jobs have tended to relieve some of these tensions as agriculture becomes less and less important in developing countries.

Chapel Hill, NC: Are you aware of the impending global peak of oil availability and its implications for agricultural productivity and thus its implications for our global population? Can you say overshoot, crash and die off? William Catton outlined this inevitable scenario for us back in the 80's with his book "Overshoot". Read it and visit http://www.peakoil.net/ to find out what geologists are saying about when the peak will occur. I think massive insecurity (war) is inevitable. A global population correction must happen one way or another. I doubt we can make the correction voluntarily in a peaceful way. Cheers, Paul

Richard Cincotta: Iíve read William Cattonís book, and a few of the other popular ìdooms day analyses.î While these authors were working out the details of humanityís demise, others -- from developing and developed countries -- were working under difficult conditions to bring public health services, secular education and womenís rights to parts of the globe where these aspects of modernity were lacking. Catton and others missed the demographic transition that was unfolding as they wrote ó and their books will probably lie dusty on library shelves because they did.

However, the demographic transition is still incomplete. About a third of the worldís nearly 200 countries remain in the early phases of the transition ó experiencing fertility rates above 4 children per woman and infant mortality rates above 40 infant deaths per thousand births. These early transition countries are predominately situated in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Others are scattered through the Andes region, parts of Central America, Southern and Central Asia and the Pacific Islands. Most of the worldís civil conflict (but not all of it) is centered in these regions.

Perhaps because fertility and infant mortality have reached very low levels in southern and eastern Europe, many people believe that it is unnecessary to worry about women's lives around the globe. Not so. Just under 1 billion people live in countries where birth rates are high, where childbearing is risky business for women, and where lives are short. If ones adds the northerly states of India, which have similar statistics, that makes almost 1.5 billion people that need these services. Globally, about 500,000 women die each year from a pregnancy related cause (some 70,000 from illegal, unsafe abortions). Yet, the U.S. -- once the leader in providing family planning services -- today appropriates only about 70 percent of its 1995 family-planning funding level (when corrected for inflation). The annual U.S. appropriation for family planning overseas is equivalent to about 9-hours-worth of current defense spending. Not much, when one considers its impact on age structure, on urban growth, and on the per-person availability of cropland and fresh water.

Los Angeles, California: Are educational interventions useful toward addressing the problem of overpopulation? If so, to what degree? Is there any information relative to this question?

Richard Cincotta: To my knowledge, the relationship between boysí education and fertility change is weak and inconsistent across countries. However, where girls reach higher grades, family sizes are smaller ó and that is true in every region of the world.

Because so many developing countries have advanced through the demographic transition -- principally in East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Caribbean (and more recently through large parts of Latin America) -- we can now say with some confidence that three factors appear to encourage this change: girlsí education, access to family planning (modern contraceptives and counseling), and access to jobs outside the home. As girlsí become better educated, research shows that child mortality tends to decline and childhood nutritional status improves ó and this, too, is true in every world region.

Here's the bottom line: When women are educated and there are opportunities to generate income, the demand for safe and effective contraception increases. When women have no chance education or any income-generating opportunity, often their only means of achieving some social recognition, from family and community, is through childbearing.

Port Harcourt City, Rivers State.: Sir, in the context of our Niger Delta Inhabitants of Nigeria; what should be the solution of the high insecurity due to the restiveness of youth which you and I know is caused by the unhelping policies that has not helped to solved need of the people which the natural resource their domain been explored by the Federal Government is not equitablly shared in the interest of the people of this Niger Delta Region.

Richard Cincotta: Nigeria has enormous wealth in natural resources and it has never equitably distributed that wealth. Nigeria is also one of those countries at the early phases of the demographic transition. Therefore, its adult population exhibits a very high proportions of young adults, and rapid urban growth. And, as populations grow larger, it becomes harder to meaningfully distribute wealth, even if that was the intention. Nigeria's situation (like Saudi Arabia's) is, as you suggest, extremely volatile.

Yet, Nigeria has remained relatively peaceful. The government has used its oil wealth to build the strength of its now huge military and internal security forces. This method of subduing the ìyouth bulgeî is similar to strategies employed by Saudi Arabia and during Saddam Hussein's reign in Iraq. The Nigerian government has used its security forces to supress local protest over the distribution of petroleum-generated income.

However, it would be unfair to discuss Nigerian security issues without reminding readers that the country has gone through a democratic election -- one that met international standards. And, it must also be said that the Nigerian military is an important player in peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

nairobi,kenya: The world population is increasing at a rate that the current state of natural resources cannot support it,we are being forced to live on natures capital instead of its interest and surplus and in actual sence we are liquidating the natural resources which we entirely depend on,what is the carrying capacity of the planet earth for us to be able to sustainably manage our ever decreasing resources because this migth soon lead to environmental collapse and a global crisis?

Richard Cincotta: "What is the carrying capacity of the earth" is an old and itneresting question. In his excellent book ìHow Many People Can the Earth Support?î, population biologist Joel Cohen reviews the calculations that social and natural scientists have made to estimate carrying capacity. The estimates vary enormously. To me, the calculation of our supposed carrying capacity is a meaningless exercise. And terms like ìenvironmental collapseî and ìglobal crisisî are impossible to define. Well over a billion people currently live in conditions that you and I have difficulty even visiting for a few hours -- yet, it apparently does not qualify for a crisis. Human society is, sadly, able to tolerate this misery.

Our technology and capacity to engineer landscapes have allowed humans to become very successful at increasing agricultural production. According to most estimates, we will likely go on increasing food production to keep abreast of population growth -- which is projected increase to between 7.4 billion and 10.6 billion people by 2050, depending on what developing and developed countries do in terms of educating girls, providing family planning services and improving the status of women during the next decades.

Of course, thereís a price for expanding and intensifying agricultural. We increase food production at the expense of nature and, often at the expense of human health and quality of life. It seems, unfortunately, that humanity currently is more than willing to pay that high price. The planet has gone through unprecedented environmental changes over the past 50 years. Our childrenís children will probably experience much less of natureís beauty and wonder than we have, and will likely deal with some very difficult environmental challenges ó among them, global warming.

Anonymous: Controlling population growth seems critical to achieving any real progress in addressing environmental issues and the related security concerns. China's legislation of family size has created its own significant issues and has not been a model followed in other countries (at least from what I've read). In the US the trend toward "freedom" from any type of regulation is increasing, so China's approach seems unrealistic. It also seems unlikely the majority of people will "choose" to limit family size. What other options (besides governmental control and personal choice) have different countries tried to help limit population growth and how effective have these efforts been?

Richard Cincotta: I think much of the criticism of Chinaís population control program is fully warranted. It has been particularly coercive in some provinces and local areas. The program is very decentralized, however, and varies from locality to locality.

While China's economy appears to have benefited greatly from the decline, some demographers wonder whether the one-child policy was necessary to accomplish this. During the period when China was enforcing its one-child policy, other countries with ìHan Chineseî majorities and minorities were experiencing similar fertility declines without coercive measures. For example, Taiwan and Singapore experienced similar declines (though Singapore reportedly had some disincentives in place). Malaysian and Chinese minorities were among the first groups to attain high levels of modern contraceptive use. Nearby, Thailand went through an early and quite rapid change in family size by making contraceptives affordable, by advertising and by opening up discussions in popular media about sexuality and contraception (and later, the threat of HIV).

Some might argue that Chinaís population was too poor and rural to go through the demographic transition in the way these ìAsian Tigersî did. I donít know if thatís true ó thereís no way to test. But, the experience in Asia suggests that when goverments whole-heartedly back family planning; when they make parents put their daughters through school; and when women have the chance to work, countries move rapidly through the demographic transition (the progress from large families and short lives, to small families and longer lives).

Gaithersburg, MD: At the other end of the spectrum from "pre-transition" countries that face security concerns, are those most advanced in the transition, such as Japan, Italy and Germany, who have reached a negative growth curve. Their governments are very concerned about economic security issues. Yet I have yet to hear anyone make the case that stable or declining populations have economic benefits. Won't a declining need for schools, roads, new construction, etc. take pressure off local and national govenments to supply new services? Isn't there too much credence given to the down side of lowering population, therby creating a false sense of insecurity?Thank You

Richard Cincotta: So far, despite all the written expression of fears of population decline, none of the most rapidly aging or declining countries has experienced unusual economic or political instability. This is particularly true in Russia, where the median age has risen to 38 years and population is declining by around 1 million people (that's about a 0.7 percent per year decline annually). While it would certainly be a national issue if this were sustained for many decades, right now there are no overt signs of an economic or security impact. Instead, Russia experienced a fairly steadily declining unemployment rate throughout the previous decade and is now among Europeís leaders in its rate of per capita GDP growth.

Japan, which should begin to decline slowly in the next few years, is the country with the highest median age in the world. Yet, it has recently experienced a rebound in their economy. The Japanese government is working hard to adjust to large numbers of elderly. This has not been easy -- it has meant that people will have to work longer before retirement, and that children may have to pay for more of their parent's medical care. Also, Japan has moved many labor-intensive jobs overseas, replaced low-skill workers with technology (including robotics) and invested in retraining adults into more technical fields. Ultimately, aging countries must undertake similar policies unless, of course, one encourages substantial flows of immigrant labor. Nonetheless, a RAND-Europe study recently made the point that immigrants will age and most will stay -- so, they too must be provided for.

At some point countries will need to stabilize their population. In parts of Europe, to do so will require removing most of the penalties of childbearing that women endure in the workplace and at home.

Steve Conklin, Worldwatch Institute: Thanks for joining us today, Rich. Thanks as well to all of our discussion participants!

Richard Cincotta: Thanks, Steve. Those were, indeed, intersting questions. Thanks to all who participated.