Pandemic preparedness needs to include small farmers
On March 12, six Asian countries (China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) participated in a simulation to predict what might happen if an easily transmissible form of avian flu started spreading among humans. Because these nations share borders and a history of migration, a pandemic could move easily within the region.
Thailand and Vietnam have been particularly hard hit by H5N1, the highly pathogenic form of avian flu that has been infecting birds and people across Asia, Europe, and Africa since 2003. Thailand’s poultry industry has lost millions of dollars, and Vietnam reports the second highest human toll from the disease after Indonesia—more than 40 deaths in total. While H5N1 has not mutated into a flu that can spread easily among people (most human deaths to date have been attributed to close contact with diseased chickens), the World Health Organization and other experts worry that it could spark the next human flu pandemic. A December 2006 study in The Lancet estimated that as many as 62 million people could die in such a pandemic, and the World Bank estimates that a pandemic could cost from $800 billion a year to $2 trillion overall.
Developing nations, such as the Asian countries that participated in Tuesday’s simulation, will likely experience the greatest numbers of deaths because they lack access to vaccines and antivirals as well as the infrastructure to deal with those infected. The World Bank estimates that $1.2–1.5 billion is needed over the next two years to address financial gaps for programs on avian and human influenza.
And while most media attention focuses on a potential flu pandemic, little has been written about the many millions of small and medium-sized poultry keepers that are suffering because they’ve been forced to kill their chickens. For backyard farmers—many of them women—chickens are “walking credit cards,” providing income, protein, and economic security in times of need. But because their birds have died from either the flu itself or the culling necessary to control the disease, many of these farmers can no longer raise chickens. At least 15 nations have restricted or even banned free-range and backyard production of chickens and are encouraging industrial style practices. While these restrictions may be necessary in the short term to stop H5N1’s spread, government and public health officials focused on pandemic preparedness should also be worried about the economic and nutritional implications for small farmers.
Comments
- Danielle Nierenberg's blog
- Login or register to post comments

RSS Feed
pandemic influenza and COOP planning
While the medical response to pandemic flu will be important to controlling its spread and limiting its toll, there are considerable non-medical issues related to flu preparedness that are essential for ensuring the continued well-being of the nation's economy. Planning for Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG) is critical to maintaining the overall viability of society. Thus, while we rightly prepare for the flu, we must be equally prepared to function during the flu.
The Center for Technology and National Security Policy of the DOD's National Defense University has prepared a number of freely-available items which can help civilians be prepared both before and during the flu. "Bird Flu and You" is a poster available in 9 languages with basic information about influenza preparedness. "Weathering the Storm" is a report with information about planning for COOP, including instructions for carrying out "tabletop excercises" with a COOP plan.
Electronic copies of the poster are available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Bird_flu.htm. Electronic copies of the report are available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP%2038%20Weathering%20The%20Storm.pdf, and to request hard copies of the
report, contact the Life Sciences group at lifesciences@ndu.edu.
Robert E. Armstrong, Ph.D.
&
Mark D. Drapeau, Ph.D.
Center for Technology and National Security Policy
National Defense University
Washington, DC
This is the view of the authors and does not represent the official view of National Defense University, the U.S. Dept. of Defense, or the U.S government.