Global Economy
by Gary Gardner | July 24, 2008
The number of "microborrowers" worldwide increased by 17 percent in 2006, according to data from the Microcredit Summit Campaign, continuing double-digit annual growth that averaged some 29 percent annually between 2001 and 2006.1 (See Figure 1.) The global loan portfolio of the 340 microfinance institutions (MFIs) tracked by the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) also grew rapidly in 2006, at some 34 percent.2 (See Table 1.) The galloping advance of microcredit is increasing pressure on many MFIs to become more sophisticated and commercially oriented in their operations-at the expense, some analysts fear, of their original mission of poverty reduction.3
Microfinance refers to financial services, including loans, savings accounts, and insurance products, that are designed to serve people with very low incomes. The average microloan size worldwide is now $1,026 and the average savings account balance is $1,126.4 Globally, the loan write-off ratio was 3.1 percent in 2006-a better record than that of many commercial banks.5 Women are a key clientele of most microfinance programs, accounting for 98 percent of borrowers in Asia and some two thirds of clients in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.6 Only in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are women a minority of customers; there, some 47 percent of borrowers are women.7
As the birthplace of microfinance, Asia leads the world in total current borrowers, with nearly 113 million-some 85 percent of the global total.8 (See Table 2.) Latin America reported the fastest growth in borrowers in 2006, at 53 percent.9 This region also has the largest overall loan portfolio, while Eastern Europe and Central Asia report the largest average loan balance per borrower.
The potential of microfinance to reduce poverty and to succeed commercially has attracted growing amounts of foreign investment. Between 2004 and 2006, foreign capital investment in microfinance more than tripled globally, to $4 billion.10 Some 75 percent of this investment went to 30 countries in Latin America and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.11 Africa and Asia, which are poorer and arguably would benefit more from microfinance, received only 6 and 7 percent respectively.12
Investment from development finance institutions (DFIs)-public monies from governments and intergovernmental organizations-jumped from $1 billion in 2004 to $2.5 billion in 2006 and now accounts for just over half of foreign investment in microfinance.13 DFIs include institutions such as the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, KfW in Germany, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in the United States. These institutions brought a commercial approach to microfinance, but they did so on flexible terms and with low interest rates that helped to build and strengthen the industry.14
Commercial institutions such as investment banks and private equity firms are investing in microfinance in expectation of high returns. The concern surrounding involvement of these institutions is that they may pressure MFIs to act more like commercial firms, for example by distributing profits to shareholders rather than reinvesting them in microfinance activities or by charging the highest possible interest rate to create the greatest financial return, even if it dilutes the social return.15 Proponents of private investment counter that commercializing microfinance is needed to attract the large sums of capital that allow it to spread rapidly.16
The commercialization debate was highlighted most dramatically in 2007 when Compartamos Banco, a Mexican MFI, became a publicly traded corporate bank offering a full range of financial services to the poor.17 Its initial public offering raised more than $450 million and drew 13 times more bids for shares than could be accommodated.18 Compartamos Banco's popularity among investors is a direct function of its profitability, which in turn stems from its relatively high interest rates-roughly 83 percent.19 This is comparable to other Mexican MFIs but well above the 30-50 percent levied in many other countries.20 Microfinance practitioners, investors, and analysts are engaged in a fierce debate regarding the validity of the Compartamos model for microfinance as a whole.
Critics maintain that the high interest rates gouge the poor and put poverty alleviation goals-traditionally the core of microfinance-on the back burner. Mohammed Yunus, winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize for pioneering work in microfinance, describes the Compartamos business model as "not consistent with microcredit" and argues that interest rates should be kept "as close to the cost of funds as possible."21 Proponents counter that Compartamos's rates fall within the range charged by many lending institutions in Mexico, are justified by the expense associated with tiny loans, and in any case are affordable-as the high repayment rate attests.22 They also argue that Compartamos plows a large share of profits back into the bank (rather than to shareholders), allowing for rapid expansion of lending to poor borrowers.23 Critics countercharge that capital for expansion could come from promoting savings among the poor, even if this meant slower rates of growth in microfinance.24
An intriguing innovation that could stimulate growth in microfinance is "branchless banking"-the use of mobile phones or a decentralized network of small retail shops for deposits and withdrawals. Retail outlets are already used for microbanking in Brazil, while mobile phones are in use in the Philippines.25 Both methods are thought to offer major cost savings for banks. In Pakistan, the setup cost of a conventional bank branch is estimated to be 30 times greater than the cost of contracting with a shopkeeper.26 And in the Philippines, where a conventional banking transaction costs $2.50, an automated transaction using a mobile phone is estimated to cost only 50¢.27 Neither mobile phone banking nor banking at retail outlets is easy to establish, however, and it remains to be seen whether branchless banking can become a mainstream financial services outlet for the poor.
The potential for expansion of microfinance could be significant. Today's 133 million microborrowers represent only 5 percent of the people living on $2 or less per day in 2001.28 Many of the unserved may not want a microloan or may not qualify for one, of course, but the experience of Bangladesh suggests that microfinance can penetrate deeply: some 62-75 percent of eligible Bangladeshis have had a microloan.29 On the other hand, Bangladesh may be exceptional; other mature microcredit markets, such as Bolivia's, have much more modest penetration rates.30 In any case, the Microcredit Summit Campaign, whose goal of recruiting 100 million borrowers between 1997 and 2005 spurred the surge in microfinance, is now working to expand the number of microcredit recipients to 175 million by 2015.31
The future of microfinance depends in part on how the industry handles the new challenges created by rapid growth. A 2008 survey of microfinance practitioners, investors, and analysts by the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation identified 20 risks that could derail the advance of microfinance.32 Six of the top 10 were management risks: management quality, corporate governance, cost control, staffing, technology management, and credit risk management.33 MFIs lacking strong management skills may find it difficult to run a successful firm if their operations expand rapidly and become more complex.
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Microcredit Clients Worldwide, 1997-2006 Growth in Microloans and Microsavings, 2004-2006 Selected Microfinance Indicators, by Region, 2006
Notes
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by Michael Renner | July 8, 2008
Driven by the gathering sense of a climate crisis, the notion of "green jobs"-especially in the renewable energy sector-is now receiving unprecedented attention. Currently about 2.3 million people worldwide work either directly in renewables or indirectly in supplier industries.1 Given incomplete data, this is in all likelihood a conservative figure. The wind power industry employs some 300,000 people, the solar photovoltaics (PV) sector accounts for an estimated 170,000 jobs, and the solar thermal industry, at least 624,000.2 More than 1 million jobs are found in the biomass and biofuels sector.3 Small-scale hydropower and geothermal energy are far smaller employers. (See Figure 1.)
Renewables tend to be a more labor-intensive energy source than the still-dominant fossil fuels, which rely heavily on expensive pieces of production equipment. A transition toward renewables thus promises job gains. Even in the absence of such a transition, growing automation and corporate consolidation are already translating into steadily fewer jobs in the oil, natural gas, and coal industries-sometimes even in the face of expanding production. Many hundreds of thousands of coal mining jobs have been shed in China, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and South Africa in the last decade or two.4 In the United States, coal output rose by almost one third during the past two decades, yet employment has been cut in half.5
A handful of countries have emerged as leaders in renewables development, thanks to strong government support. A study commissioned by the German government found that in 2006 the country had some 259,000 direct and indirect jobs in the renewables sector.6 The number is expected to reach 400,000-500,000 by 2020 and then 710,000 by 2030.7
Spain also has seen its renewables industry expand rapidly in recent years. The industry now employs some 89,000 people directly (mostly in wind power and PV) and another 99,000 indirectly.8 Denmark has long been a leader in wind development. But with policy support there less steady in recent years, the number of domestic wind jobs has stagnated at about 21,000.9
In the United States, federal policies have been weak and inconsistent over the years, leaving leadership to individual state governments. Still, a study for the American Solar Energy Society found that the U.S. renewables sector employed close to 200,000 people directly in 2006 and another 246,000 indirectly.10
India's Suzlon is one of the world's leading wind turbine manufacturers, further strengthening its position through its 2007 takeover of Germany's REpower.11 Manufacturing of wind turbine components, production of spare parts, and turbine maintenance by Suzlon and other companies are helping to generate much-needed income and employment in India.12 Suzlon currently employs more than 13,000 people directly-about 10,000 in India, and the remainder in China, Belgium, and the United States.13
China is rapidly catching up in solar PVs and wind turbine manufacturing and is already the dominant force in solar hot water and small hydropower development.14 According to rough estimates, close to a million people in China currently work in the renewables sector.15 To some extent, these numbers reflect China's low labor productivity compared with Western countries. This seems especially true in the solar thermal industry, which is thought to employ some 600,000 people.16
The leaders in renewables technologies can expect considerable job gains in the near future in manufacturing solar panels and wind turbines for both domestic and export markets. Jobs in installing, operating, and maintaining renewable energy systems tend to be more local in nature and could thus benefit a broad range of countries.
For instance, Kenya has one of the largest and most dynamic solar markets in the developing world. There are 10 major solar PV import companies, and the country has an estimated 1,000-2,000 solar technicians.17 In Bangladesh, Grameen Shakti has installed more than 100,000 solar home systems in rural communities in a few years-one of the fastest-growing solar PV programs in the world-and is aiming for 1 million by 2015, along with the creation of some 100,000 jobs for local youth and women as solar technicians and repair and maintenance specialists.18
Four countries-Brazil, the United States, China, and Germany-are leading in biomass development. Brazil's ethanol industry is said to employ about 300,000 workers.19 Indonesia and Malaysia are leading palm oil producers; a small but growing share is being diverted there to biofuels production. Malaysia has an estimated half-million people employed in the palm oil industry (and another million people whose livelihoods are connected to it)-many of them Indonesian migrant workers.20 Indonesia is itself planning a major expansion, and optimistic projections speak of 3.5 million new plantation jobs by 2010.21
Following a wave of initial enthusiasm, there are now rising doubts about the environmental benefits and economic impacts of at least some types of biofuels, however.22 And the jobs that are being created need close scrutiny as well. Biofuels processing typically requires higher skills and thus is likely to offer better pay than feedstock production and harvesting. But most jobs are found at sugarcane and palm oil plantations, where wages and working conditions are often extremely poor.
The Brazilian sugarcane industry has historically been marked by exploitation of seasonal laborers and by the takeover of smaller-scale farms by large plantation owners, often by violent means.23 The prevailing piece-rate system leaves many Brazilian plantation workers earning a pittance, and some end up in debt bondage. Living conditions are often squalid.24 In Indonesia, too, poverty is common among plantation workers, who face unsafe working conditions, frequent denial of their rights, and intimidation by employers.25
The expansion of plantations for biofuels also threatens to come at the expense of rural jobs and rural communities. Oil palm companies seeking to acquire land in Indonesia's West Kalimantan, for example, have been found to hold out false promises of jobs for local communities.26 A 2006 study of the area found that small farming systems provided livelihoods for 260 times as many people per hectare of land as oil palm plantations did.27
According to the Woods Hole Research Center, India could create some 900,000 jobs by 2025 in biomass gasification.28 Of this total, 300,000 jobs would be with manufacturers of gasifier stoves (including masons, metal fabricators, and so on) and 600,000 would be in biomass production, processing into briquettes and pellets, supply chain operations, and after-sales services.29 Another 150,000 people might find employment in advanced biomass cooking technologies.30
While biofuels are now subject to more critical reviews on a number of fronts, the future looks promising for wind and solar. Global Wind Energy Outlook 2006 outlines three scenarios-conservative, moderate, and advanced-for future worldwide wind energy development, assuming different rates of investments and capacity expansion.31 (See Figure 2.) Global wind power employment is projected to grow to as much as 2.1 million in 2030 and 2.8 million in 2050 under the advanced scenario.32 Solar Generation IV, a 2007 report by the European Photovoltaic Industry Association and Greenpeace International, similarly projects worldwide solar PV developments via three scenarios.33 By 2030, as many as 6.3 million jobs could be created under the best case scenario.34 (See Figure 3.)
Expanding the role of renewables helps make other sectors of the economy, such as transportation and buildings, more sustainable-thus greening additional jobs to some degree.
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Estimated Worldwide Employment in Renewable Energy, 2006 Global Wind Power Employment Projections, Three Scenarios, 2010–2050 Global Solar PV Employment Projections, Three Scenarios, 2010–2030
Notes
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by Alessandra Delgado | May 6, 2008
For many poor people in urban areas, the
primary means of economic survival is the production
or sale of goods or services through
semi-legal or illegal ventures, known as the
informal economy.1 Conservatively, informal
employment accounts for half to three quarters
of all nonagricultural employment in developing
countries: 48 percent in North Africa, 51
percent in Latin America, 65 percent in Asia,
and 72 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.2
In the 13 principal metropolitan areas of
Bogotá, Colombia, 58.5 percent of workers are
classified as informal.3 In Bolivia, the informal
sector provides an estimated two thirds of the
gross domestic product (GDP), and in Peru the
figure is 58 percent.4 Because of the sheer number
of workers, clients, budgets, and transactions
involved in informal markets, legality is
marginal; informality is the norm.5
The greatest increase in the informal
economy since 1990 has occurred in sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia—
often accounting for more than 50 percent of
GDP.6 (See Figure 1.) The last few years have
seen a continuation of this trend, with Africa
and Latin America having the highest levels of
informality.7 In contrast, in Europe the growth
of informality is slowing and even declining in
the wake of extensive microeconomic reforms,
while in East Asia, where firms face smaller regulatory
and tax burdens, the informal economy
remains stable at fairly low levels.8
The weight of such markets becomes clear
when considering that economic power is concentrated
in the cities. The purchases made by
urbanites, who cannot live off
the land, form the foundation of
national economies.9 Although
60 percent of the labor force in India is in the
agricultural sector, for instance, they produce
only 20 percent of the GDP, while the 28 percent
of the population working in services provide
61 percent.10
Several factors combine to create the unique
yet common pattern of informal markets. First,
exaggerated government intervention in civil
society and economic activity often creates
“hyper-bureaucratization” that deters citizens
from pursuing a legal path.11 For example, it is
virtually impossible for 90 percent of Tanzanians
to enter the legal economy.12 A poor entrepreneur
who obeyed the law would, over 50 years
of business life, pay $91,000 to the national
government for licenses, permits, and approvals
and spend 1,118 days in government offices
petitioning for them.13A private company can
only be incorporated in Dar es Salaam and
would cost nearly $2,700—almost four times
the average annual wage of an ordinary Tanzanian.
14 Similarly, in Peru the constant increase
in sales taxes—which went from 5 to 15 percent
from 1978 to 1987 and today stand at 19
percent—favored expansion of the informal
sector.15
Second, governments lack the resources to
meet the demands of urbanization and enforce
laws. Heavily indebted governments with limited
tax collection and with convoluted and
uninformed bureaucracies cannot provide adequate
social expenditures.16 Rapid urbanization
in developing countries has created pressures
that have constrained the capacity of cities to
provide adequate employment, waste disposal,
water supply, food supplies, and housing.17
Urbanization itself has thus bred new types of
economic arrangements and social conditions.
Third, as businesses are unable to create jobs
as fast as demand increases, people must find a
way to survive outside of regulated employment.
18 And fourth, many national and international
companies prefer informal employment
relations that allow them to be flexible during
production cycles and that reduce labor costs.19
Thus it is not uncommon to visit an emerging
market and perceive chaotic and unregulated
yet bustling economies. Dharavi in India,
the largest and most established of Mumbai’s
slums, by one estimate houses up to 10,000
small factories, almost all of them illegal and
unregulated.20 The factories provide an income
for the approximately 1 million people who live
in an area barely half the size of New York City’s
Central Park.21 Although the concentration of
businesses could easily deter consumers, the
large scale at which informality occurs yields
an estimated $665 million in annual revenue.22
On a national scale, in Haiti untitled
rural and urban real estate
holdings are together worth some
$5.2 billion—four times the assets
of all the legally operating companies
in Haiti, nine times the assets
owned by the government, and
158 times the value of all foreign
direct investment in Haiti up
through 1995.23
As the economic potential is
great, the economic loss is equally
substantial. Workers and enterprises
receive little if any legal protection
or worker benefits, they are
the target of bribery, and they often
face competitive disadvantages in
terms of larger formal firms in capital
and product markets.24 Variations
in incomes are great: in
Bolivia, the owner of a small informal
business might have an average income 12
times the national minimum wage, while informally
paid workers and domestic servants make
around half the minimum wage.25
Furthermore, there are indirect costs to
informality. The unsafe working conditions
found in the unregulated businesses of Dharavi,
India, for example, are common throughout the
world. In dark unventilated foundries, workers
ladle molten metal into a belt-buckle mold held
between their bare feet.26 In another warehouse,
men smeared from head to toe in blue ink strip
the casings from used ballpoint pens so they
can be melted down and recycled; few wear
gloves or other protective gear, despite exposure
to solvents and other chemicals.27 Environmental
and health hazards are just one of the realities
workers have to withstand to be able to
produce with minimal resources.
The indirect costs also exact a hefty social
price. Even though the informal market has
local arrangements that help keep track of
transactions, the legitimacy of these informal
rights is still too locally politicized compared
with those that are protected by national law.28
The inability to determine the rightful owner
of resources creates or exacerbates conflicts
throughout the world.29 In Bangalore, India,
extortion exists even in hospitals: new mothers
have their infants whisked away by an attendant
who demands a bribe.30 If you want to see your
child, families are told, the price is $12 for a
boy and $7 for a girl.31 Such new “enterprises”
are the result of a combination of a real need
and a lack of regulation.
The lack of regulation distorts economic and
social systems. With little or no unbiased and
standardized regulation, most potential assets
in emerging markets have not been identified
or realized, there is little accessible capital, and
economies are constrained and sluggish.32 It is
not surprising, then, that extensive preliminary
research shows that countries with a sophisticated
legal and political system and stronger
protection of physical and intellectual property
rights experience higher economic well-being.33
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Informal Economy as Share of Gross Domestic Product, by Region or Country, 1999/2000 and 2002/2003
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by Erik Assadourian | February 14, 2008
In 2007, gross world product (GWP)—the aggregated total of all finished goods and services produced worldwide—was expected to grow 5.4 percent to $72.3 trillion (in 2007 dollars).1 (See Figure 1.) This estimate reflects actual purchasing power in countries (that is, in purchasing power parity or PPP terms). The market exchange rate GWP, which is based on straightforward monetary terms, was expected to reach $53.4 trillion, an increase of 8 percent since 2006.2 The projected growth of GWP (PPP) in 2007 was revised downward from earlier estimates due particularly to economic disruptions in the U.S. housing market, which also had ripple effects in other countries, particularly within Europe and in Japan.3 Even with this late-term contraction, growth in 2007 was still expected to be higher than the average since 1970.4 (See Figure 2.)
The U.S. economy was projected to grow 2.1 percent in 2007, nearly 1 percent slower than the previous year.5 This significant contraction came in large part from the turmoil felt in the subprime mortgage sector, with foreclosures, reductions in residential investments, and declining housing values reducing growth as well as consumer confidence.6 Rising gasoline prices also had a significant impact.7 U.S. economic growth is expected to slow further in 2008.8
Although the U.S. economy still accounts for 19 percent of the world total, China is closing the gap—now accounting for 16 percent of GWP, up from 15 percent in 2006.9 China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew dramatically in 2007, jumping an estimated 11.7 percent and making up one third of the projected $3.7 trillion in GWP growth in 2007.10 Increases in exports and investments drove this expansion.11
Growth in China’s GDP, however, has not come without cost. China is increasingly suffering from the externalities of economic growth: politically destabilizing inequality and pollution. Today, only 1 percent of China’s 560 million urban residents breathe air that is considered safe by European Union (EU) standards.12 Air and water pollution have led to numerous occurrences of social unrest.13 And China is now the leading producer of sulfur dioxide emissions and has nearly surpassed the United States in total carbon dioxide emissions (though not in per capita emissions).14
The European Union now accounts for 21 percent of GWP, which as an aggregate makes it the largest economy in the world.15 The EU economy was expected to grow 3.2 percent in 2007, having slowed in some countries due to investments in troubled U.S. financial markets.16
India’s economy was expected to grow 9.1 percent in 2007, accounting for 11 percent of total GWP growth—more than the U.S. contribution.17 Growth in the world’s second most populous nation was mainly driven by domestic demand.18
Sub-Saharan Africa was projected to grow 6.1 percent—with this growth coming mostly from oil exports and from the dominant South African economy, which makes up one third of the region’s gross product.19 Although it is now growing more quickly than in the past, sub-Saharan Africa still accounts for just 2.6 percent of the global economy.20
Per capita GWP was expected to reach $10,956 in 2007.21 (See Figure 3.) This was a growth of 4.1 percent—less than total GWP growth because world population increased by nearly 77 million people.22 Yet GWP per capita does not reflect the vast disparity in GDP per person—even when these figures are expressed in purchasing power parity terms. In the United States, GDP per person is $44,974, for example, while in China the figure is $8,780 and in India it is just $4,183.23
Economic growth is having a direct impact on the ecological systems on which the human economy depends. As the U.N. Environmental Programme’s recently published Global Environmental Outlook–4 notes, human society is using the world’s renewable resources unsustainably, thus degrading farmland and fisheries, rivers and forests.24 And society is risking a significant weakening of the global economy if unsustainable resource use is not addressed. In particular, climate change could reduce economic growth by anywhere from 5 to 20 percent by 2100 if left unchecked.25
These warnings are not new. In 2005 the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment made it clear that nearly two thirds of ecosystem services have been degraded or are being used unsustainably, and indicators like the Ecological Footprint have demonstrated that human society has been living beyond its means since 1987.26 According to this measure, humans are now using the equivalent of 1.25 planets’ worth of resources.27 (See Figure 4.) In short, without dramatic redesign of the global economy to reduce the ecological impacts, growth will most likely plummet—for instance, as extreme weather events disrupt agricultural production, flood coastal cities, and cause devastating wildfires.
Several analyses reveal that if ecological degradation is factored into economic calculations, true growth is much lower. In 2004, the Chinese government designed a Green GDP measure to subtract pollution costs from traditional GDP calculations.28 The estimate for that year found that growth would have been 3.1 percent lower if these costs had been deducted.29 Then in 2007, before releasing its 2005 analysis, the Chinese government shelved this indicator when it discovered that factoring in environmental costs would have reduced growth in some provinces to zero.30
GDP is a poor measure of actual economic progress, as it counts all monetary expenditures as positive—whether the money is spent on useful goods, such as food or durables, or on mitigating social ills that could have been prevented. In the United States, the nongovernmental organization Redefining Progress continues to track its Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), a measure that provides a better analysis of economic progress by subtracting out pollution and resource degradation, crime, and other economic ills while adding in unmeasured benefits like volunteer work and parenting.31 According to the most recent analysis, while U.S. GDP per capita nearly doubled since 1970, the GPI grew just 13 percent.32 (See Figure 5.)
Recognizing that not all growth is good, some governments are starting to question whether economic growth should be a priority at all. Thailand, for example, has been investigating a transition to a “sufficiency economy,” where the focus is on poverty alleviation (that is, targeted growth), economic self-reliance, and resource conservation.33 While still in the theoretical stage, if some pioneering countries move toward this model, perhaps there will be a shift away from the unsustainable idea that infinite growth on a finite planet is a measure of economic success.
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Gross World Product, 1970-2007 Growth of Gross World Product, 1971-2007 Gross World Product Per Person, 1970-2007 Humanity's Ecological Footprint, 1961-2003 GDP and GPI Per Person, United States, 1950-2004
Notes
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